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Abstract. religious traditions can be sources of values and attitudes supporting 
the liberal polity in ways that political theorizing and conceptions of public reason 
often fail to recognize. moreover, religious traditions can give support through 
the ways reason is crucial to their self-understanding. one understanding of 
Judaism is examined as an example. Also, the particularism of traditions can 
encourage commitment to universally valid values and ideals. reason’s role in 
Judaism and other religious traditions makes possible constructive interaction 
between those traditions and between religious and secular thought. exclusion 
of religiously grounded considerations from the discourse and deliberations of 
liberal polities can be counterproductively illiberal.
This paper considers some aspects of the relation between religion and 
the liberal-democratic polity. The two main themes of the discussion 
are: (1) much contemporary theorizing concerning liberal-democracy 
fails to recognize significant religiously grounded supports for the liberal 
polity; and (2) There are ways that religious traditions can interact 
constructively, with mutual benefit, in the pluralistic liberal polity. both 
issues are explained, at least in part, by a failure to recognize the role reason 
has in the self-understandings of some religious traditions. The more we 
recognize that aspect of those traditions, the more clearly we will see 
that some of the main reasons given for excluding religiously grounded 
considerations from public, political discourse are unconvincing, and in 
some respects, unfair to religion. The discussion focuses on Judaism but 
the chief considerations apply to other religious traditions, as well.
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The main elements of the view defended are the following:
(a) religiously grounded considerations are an important source of 
the commitment to some of the fundamental values the pluralistic 
liberal polity both respects and reflects, and they are a basis for 
perspectives and attitudes that can support a liberal political order.
(b) religiously grounded values are, in fact, of more fundamental 
concern, to many people than political principles, and it is not 
necessarily an error of reason that they should see things that way.
(c) Acquiring values and attitudes through participation in 
a  particular religious tradition does not, as such, limit the 
scope and applicability of many of those values and attitudes. 
one can acquire universally valid moral commitments through 
a  particular tradition. Also, different traditions, even when 
anchored in histories claimed to involve revelation, can engage 
each other rationally and constructively.
(d) The contrast between religion and reason, especially when 
there is an emphasis on the contrast between revealed religion 
and reason, is often overstated. even in revealed religion there 
can be a crucially important role for reason in articulating and 
explicating religious values and commitments.
There surely are politically repugnant, intolerant, and intolerable forms 
of religiously based conduct. There is plenty of religiously fuelled 
hatred, cruelty, and violence, and there are many forms of religion that 
could not  – and should not  – be accommodated by the liberal polity. 
but they are not just extreme versions of an illiberal feature intrinsic to 
religion. Indeed, I  will argue that there are respects in which religion 
has been a  vitally important support to the liberal polity, historically 
and conceptually. religion can be a  support to the liberal polity, and 
interaction between different religious traditions can contribute to 
a deepened, shared understanding of moral values even in the absence 
of a standard of public reason.1
1 my argument draws upon Nicholas Wolterstorff ’s critique of some contemporary 
forms of liberalism as unfair to religion and his broader critique of some of the most 
influential recent liberal theory and its employment of the notion of public reason. see, 
for example, his, ‘Why We should reject What liberalism Tells us about speaking 
and Acting in Public for religious reasons’, in Paul J. Weithman, ed., Religion and 
Contemporary Liberalism (south bend, IN: university of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 
pp. 162-181. And see his, ‘Habermas on religious reasons in the Public sphere’, in N. 
Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy (New York: oxford university Press, 
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I.
by ‘liberal polity’ I mean a political order in which rights and liberties 
of individuals are fundamentally important, as is the rule of law and 
the role of citizens and their elected representatives in making the law. 
Also, a liberal polity enforces morality less rather than more, providing 
wider rather than narrower scope for persons to choose and pursue 
ends and interests, being accommodative with regard to people’s 
different conceptions of what makes for a  good life. Thus, the liberal 
polity’s restraint with regard to enforcing morality permits a significant 
measure of pluralism. There is no conceptual requirement that a liberal 
polity must be as morally austere as possible, striving to be as close 
to neutrality as possible.2 The liberal order itself reflects significant 
valuative commitments and its institutions are informed by certain 
principles, especially concerning extensive individual liberties. In that 
way the liberal order makes possible a diverse, pluralistic civil society. 
To coherently sustain the freedoms required for civil society of that kind 
broad, stable endorsement of certain fundamental values and principles 
is required. The restrained legal moralism of a liberal polity itself needs 
to be underwritten by widely shared substantive moral commitments.
A  liberal order is not ‘naturally’ or automatically self-sustaining. It 
requires that people have a genuine, efficacious commitment to certain 
values and that they will not hate or despise their neighbours simply for 
being different, and will not demand that differences be repressed, and 
will tolerate at least some behaviours and people they neither admire nor 
even approve. It is work to sustain a liberal order, and that work requires 
participatory endorsement on the part of citizens. Pluralism requires 
a coherent, broadly supported framework.
some ways of life and some value-commitments are symptomatic of 
moral corruption, error or perversity. A liberal polity has no obligation 
to accommodate them though it may elect to err on the side of tolerance. 
If conduct is objectionable to some but there is no clear evidence that it is 
harmful, then liberal principles – if not majoritarian politics – are likely 
2013), pp.  353-376. The notion of public reason figures prominently in recent work 
by Jurgen Habermas, John rawls, and robert Audi, to mention just a  few influential 
contemporary theorists of the liberal-democratic state.
2 There is a brief, very helpful summary of the main issues involved in the debate 
concerning liberalism and legal moralism – especially in regard to criminal justice – in 
Jeffrie murphy, ‘legal moralism and liberalism’, in Character, Liberty, and Law: Kantian 
Essays in Theory and Practice (london: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 89-117.
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to support permissibility. In this sort of disputed matter democratic 
politics and political principles may be in tension with each other. (In 
the united states at present, some political controversies are disputes 
over where the lines between ‘objectionable’ and ‘impermissibly wrong’ 
should be drawn. examples are the question of whether homosexuals 
should be allowed to marry, and the decriminalization of marijuana.) 
Pluralism can be tested severely when groups with different values 
believe that their differences constitute conflicts that must be resolved. 
There is not some single formula or well-defined principle applicable to 
all such cases.
That fact makes it all the more significant that, in addition to 
institutional forms and legal permissions certain moral-psychological 
attitudes and dispositions are needed in order for a  liberal polity to 
succeed as a liberal polity. A social world characterized by dispositions 
of civility  – including restraint with regard to insistence on moral 
uniformity  – is less vulnerable to moral differences motivating bitter 
alienation and hostility. of course, faith-traditions can exhibit firm 
limits on how pluralistically accommodative they will be. but traditions 
can transmit and support dispositions of civility and the willingness to 
engage in dialectic rather than conflict. For example, religiously based 
traditions might habituate people in a concern for fairness, respect for 
others, civility in political discourse, and toleration of differences as ways 
of loving the neighbour.
Adherents of a  specific tradition are, of course, likely to regard its 
values as true values. but that does not imply that those persons will be 
opposed to pluralism. regarding others as mistaken need not immediately 
translate into political exclusion, discrimination or civil disqualification. 
religiously committed persons can acknowledge the merits of the liberal 
rule of law even as they maintain their specific commitments.
moreover, why must commitment to the values and principles crucial 
to the liberal order have a single source or be articulated by a single set 
of terms, which all reasonable persons would find acceptable? Indeed, 
it might be unreasonable to expect that to be the case. Historically, 
religion is a source of principles such as the equal standing of all persons 
as participants in a  common moral world, the central importance of 
justice, that persons are not to be regarded or treated with contempt 
or in degrading ways, and so forth. In some respects liberal principles 
such as the equal standing of free persons under the rule of law, and the 
importance of respecting persons in a distinctive manner, not contingent 
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upon their achievements, skills, or station have religious bases. Torah 
teaches that we are ‘to love our fellows’ (lev. 19:18), to aid the distressed 
and the unfortunate (exod. 22:24), to do justice and to be merciful 
(Deut. 10:12, and micah 6:8), to enact and uphold good laws (see Deut. 
5:30, 6:2-3, 8:6-18), and overall, to ‘walk in the ways of the Lord’, to 
pattern our own activity on God’s activity (Deut. 13:5, 28:9). such values 
and attitudes are often acquired through participation in a  particular 
tradition. That need not be an obstacle to people seeing that they have 
universal applicability, a point discussed further below.
one might suggest that values, if they are rationally supportable, can 
be supported independently of the religious traditions in which they 
have figured. However, that supposes that people’s attachments to the 
values crucial to the political order can be independent of the particular 
sources in which the values are rooted. For many people politics is not 
fundamental; the question of what values should inform the political 
order is not an exclusively political issue for them, and it is not clear that 
someone is being irrational or immoral for regarding something other 
than political principles as the source of values regarding the political 
order. For many rational persons, political principles depend, at least to 
some extent, upon values with other sources or grounds. That the values 
crucial to liberal-democracy and its conception of the rule of law might 
have religious sources among their roots is more than an interesting 
historical fact. And it is not clear that persons are irrational for remaining 
faithful to the source of a  value even if the value is supportable by 
considerations independent of that source.
Here I want to comment on the relevance of an important tradition of 
Jewish thought. maimonides is a key figure in it but its elements are not 
uniquely maimonidean nor uniquely medieval.3 In this understanding 
of Judaism there are rational justifications for the commandments 
through which Jews are constituted a people in covenant with God. (The 
view concerns all six hundred thirteen commandments, not just the 
Decalogue.) The commandments are not tests of thoughtless obedience, 
and fulfilling them is not brittle legalism. The view maintains that among 
3 In ‘The epistemology of moral Tradition: A  Defense of a  maimonidean Thesis’, 
I  develop the notion of ‘rational tradition’ more fully, and I  explicate elements of 
maimonides’s contribution to that notion. see, The Review of Metaphysics, september 
2010. see also my, ‘Tradition, rationality, and moral life: medieval Judaism’s Insight’, in 
Judaic Sources and Western Thought: Jerusalem’s Enduring Presence, ed. Jonathan Jacobs 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2011), pp.127-152.
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the commandments is the injunction to study the Law in order to deepen 
and enlarge one’s understanding of it. This is integral to appreciating the 
divine wisdom and benevolence informing the commandments and it is 
a way to more fully appreciate the gratitude and obedience we owe to God.
Jewish thinkers regularly point to Deuteronomy 4: 5-8 as the 
scriptural basis of the requirement to employ reason in the study of the 
commandments as a way of living in accord with them. The passage says:
behold, I have taught you statutes and ordinances ... that ye should do so 
in the midst of the land whither ye go in to possess it. observe therefore 
and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight 
of the people, that, when they hear all these statutes, shall say: ‘surely this 
great nation is a wise and understanding people.’ For what great nation is 
there that hath God so nigh to them, as the Lord our God is whensoever 
we call upon Him? And what great nation is there, that hath statutes and 
ordinances so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day.
maimonides and other influential medieval Jewish philosophers, such 
as saadia and bahya ibn Pakuda were anxious to elaborate the role of 
reason in Judaism and the role of understanding in human perfection. 
There are aspects of their views that are not merely ‘local’ to the medieval 
period. Their conceptions of how reason and revelation are modes of 
access to one body of truth can survive the abandonment of much of 
their medieval metaphysics and epistemology.
There is a  complex debate over the question of whether this view 
of the rationality of the commandments is, or is like, a  natural law 
conception of ethics. There is not space to explore that issue here but 
it is indicative of the plausibility of interpreting the commandments as 
rationally justifiable. Commenting on the role of reason in regard to 
fulfilling the commandments, while denying that the commandments 
should be interpreted as reflecting natural law, michael levine writes:
In saying that the law is not natural maimonides does not mean that it is 
not rational or objective. Certainly divine commandments are objective, 
and for maimonides they are accessible to reason as well, in the sense 
already stated. We can discover what the reasons for the laws are. moral 
rules and human law are also objective insofar as a moral rule or law 
must fulfill a function if it is to be counted as a moral rule or law at all. 
merely the fact that law has been revealed does not imply that it cannot 
be known through reason as well and extended in the establishment and 
embellishment of the moral-legal code.4
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The chief point for present purposes is that a significant current of Jewish 
thought regards revelation as a  gracious act of divine guidance, and 
regards the content of that guidance as rationally intelligible. of course 
there are many different traditions and perspectives within Judaism. 
Also, there are many people whose illiberal commitments and hostility 
to an open, diverse civil society – and antipathy to reason – are grounded 
in and fuelled by religion. However, there are significant currents of 
thought in Abrahamic monotheism in general, and in Judaism in 
particular, lending thoughtful, reasoned support to values supportive of 
the liberal rule of law and a civic culture in which rights, freedoms, and 
moral standing are centrally important.4
The notion that elements of a  religion’s moral teaching can be 
explicated in rational terms figures in important forms of Christian and 
Islamic tradition, as well. Assuming a clean break between religion and 
reason can lead to serious misrepresentations. one is the notion that, 
for a religious person, religion trumps rational considerations without 
concern for the epistemic (or moral) cost. That ignores those religious 
traditions in which seeking fuller understanding is itself a fundamental 
religious obligation. The medievals articulated sophisticated accounts 
of how reason and revelation, in mutual support, concern one body of 
truth. There are plenty of reasons not to think of that period as a source 
of liberal principles. still, it is a  mistake to dismiss medieval thought 
as so alien to liberal values that it has nothing to offer regarding the 
relation between reason and religion. All three Abrahamic monotheisms 
developed rationalistically oriented accounts of their own commitments 
and traditions.
We should not expect there to be some single, rationally compelling 
basis for the liberal-democratic political order and rational consensus on 
its basic features. That is unrealistically optimistic, given that there are 
rival reasonable conceptions of such an order and of why it is important to 
establish it. While the liberal order makes pluralism of values politically 
acceptable it can also benefit from the latter in the sense that there are 
different sorts of reasons for being committed to the liberal order. It is 
not clear why endorsement of such an order should come through just 
one, common pathway or why a religious source of liberal values should 
be regarded as suspect or be disqualified.
4 michael levine, ‘The role of reason in the ethics of maimonides’, The Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 1986), 285.
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In rawls’ view, ‘[u]nderstanding how to conduct oneself as a demo-
cratic citizen includes understanding an ideal of public reason.’5 And, 
‘with respect to fundamental political issues, we are to debate in the 
public arena and to act (or to be ready and able to debate and act), on the 
basis of principles of justice that we can reasonably expect all those of 
our fellow citizens who are reasonable and rational to accept.’6
If we consider what motivates endorsement of the sorts of principles 
crucial to a  liberal polity, and ask whether the principles and the 
motivations can come entirely from political considerations, we can see 
that, for many people, the relevant principles and values are supplied 
from outside of political thought. It is not evident that such grounding 
is necessarily less than rational. moreover, the notion of ‘public reason’ 
is as contestable as the notion of natural law or the notion of a  liberal 
polity. Consider the debates about various fundamental economic issues, 
about the scope of legitimate state power, about what conduct should be 
criminalized, and about what form criminal sanction should take. The 
contestability does not mean we cannot distinguish between plausible 
and implausible conceptions of such matters. There is a  vital role for 
reason even if there are not strict criteria for what counts as satisfying 
a standard of public reason.
In his critique of rawls’ theory of the principles of justice of the liberal 
state Wolterstorff argues that, if we suppose that someone has followed 
the method rawls advocates:
... no matter what those resultant principles of justice may be, the 
reasonable thing for her to expect is not that all reasonable people who 
use their common human reason will agree with her results, but that not 
all reasonable people will agree. It would be utterly unreasonable for her 
to expect anything else than disagreement.7
Nor is it necessary that all persons should agree on fundamental political 
issues. It is perhaps just as important – if not more important – that people 
should have a  habit of civility such that disagreement and argument 
remain tolerable. As Wolterstorff observes, ‘[r]arely do we succeed in 
reaching consensus even among reasonable people of all these different 
stripes; but we try. Then, finally, we vote. Are we, in voting under these 
5 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Why We should reject What liberalism Tells us about 
speaking and Acting in Public for religious reasons’, p. 172.
6 Ibid., p. 174.
7 Ibid., p. 174.
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circumstances, all violating somebody’s freedom and equality?’8 A habit 
of civility can be much more important to keeping a frictional dialectic 
going instead of hostile alienation or a resort to force.
In addition, in moral-psychological terms the strategy of compart-
mentalization of the political and the religious might leave us needlessly 
diminished resources for supplying and supporting ideals and principles.9 
There may be many persons for whom commitment to religion is crucial 
to their commitment to some of the values we would expect a  liberal 
polity to endorse but, for those persons, the values are anchored in 
religion and not in autonomous political principles. The notion of the 
individual as meriting respect and as never to be treated merely as 
a means has deep roots in the biblical anthropology of human beings as 
created in God’s image. That the individual has irreducible worth is one 
reason why doing justice is felt by many people to have a deep, abiding 
claim on us. That political rule is to be the rule of law, its legitimacy 
grounded in the justice of law and not the will of the ruler, has biblical 
roots. The notion that it is wrong to degrade or humiliate another, that 
it is wrong to oppress others or to abandon the weak, the helpless, and 
the destitute, all have biblical roots. Why should politics require that 
religious grounds for such values be excluded?
one way of arguing for only nonreligious grounds for values is that 
such an approach makes the same justifying considerations accessible 
to all, and it claims that there are distinctively political principles reason 
can ascertain independent of any particular tradition. In such a view the 
normative considerations in favour of the political order (liberal values 
making for a  liberal polity) are values that people should share in the 
same way because that is what makes possible the liberal order. It has 
normative priority because it is the enabling condition for the diverse 
values of individuals living in that political order. This understanding 
of the liberal polity has elicited a  good deal of support. Yet, there are 
reasons for thinking that, for many persons, the motivational and 
8 Ibid., p. 175.
9 For many persons, moral education occurs in a way that is thickly informed with 
religious ideas and ideals. The acquisition of moral concepts is learned through coming 
to understand the significance of paradigmatic examples, which are often scripturally 
based. That does not mean the scope and meaning of the relevant moral values are 
confined to a religious context. However, religion can be a significant source in regard 
to moral education, the shaping of attitudes and perspectives, and a disposition of moral 
seriousness.
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substantive roots of a strong liberal order are in deeper soil than that of 
rationally endorsable political arrangements. For many people, religious 
commitment and the way religion is a guide to conduct and to life are 
more fundamental to them than politics.
It is not just that it is unlikely that people will give up their religious 
commitments or refuse to distance them from the discussion of 
political issues. rather, several religiously important values are not only 
consistent with the liberal political order but they also are enduringly 
relevant supports for it. For example, many people hold that the fact that 
we are created in the image of God underwrites the moral regard due 
to each human being. It is what makes possible relations with others on 
the basis of an understanding of the distinctive value of a person and 
on the basis of requirements fashioned by wisdom and benevolence, 
rather than human convention. It is what underwrites our conceptions 
of ourselves as having worth and dignity, whatever our station in life and 
whatever our circumstances. That human beings possess intellect and 
will is the basis of respect for, and concern for, all human beings. It is also 
the basis for the inestimable value of each person as an individual, for the 
‘separateness of persons’ as distinct individuals.10
biblical moral anthropology includes the notion of the community 
being governed by the rule of law along with the notion of the individual 
having significant standing. each individual possesses reason and will, 
and each person is an accountable agent with a  relationship to God 
through the exercise of his own thought, choices, and actions.
As a  matter of historical fact, at least in the West, there is wide 
acknowledgment that the social world is likely to be religiously diverse 
and that the political order should tolerate such diversity. even those 
who argue that their religion requires them to take specific stands on 
social issues rarely, if ever, argue that the political community should be 
theocratically governed. What are at issue are values, not sovereignty. 
As remarked above, there is a  strong current of Jewish thought that 
maintains that we are to strive to understand and articulate our ethical 
commitments and judgments as fully rationally as we can. However, that 
is not the same as requiring that such commitments and judgments must 
10 rawls employed the notion of the ‘separateness of persons’ as part of his critique of 
utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice. rawls argued that one of the defects of utilitarianism 
is that it fails to adequately recognize the separateness of persons. The failure is in the way 
that utilitarianism focuses on the good overall brought about by an action or a policy, 
without morally distinguishing the impact on individuals.
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be fully or purely rational – whatever that might mean – or must satisfy 
a  standard of public reason. The religious grounding is not a  built-in 
impediment to rational reflection or criticism.
A liberal order (even more than other types) depends on the kinds 
of agents participating in it and how they regard each other. shared 
commitments to regard each other as having equal status as moral agents 
are crucial. each person is a locus of judgment, valuative perspective, and 
thought-informed activity. A  liberal order requires more than merely 
tolerating a wide range of behaviours and preferences. Honouring the 
equal status of other persons’ rights and claims can require more than 
just not actively harming. In the Jewish understanding one is to relate to 
others not only in accord with terms restricting harm and interference 
but also through understanding others as neighbours in a community 
capable of open-ended striving toward moral improvement.
A liberal polity needs a common valuative core, commitment to which 
may have multiple sources as, for instance, in different faith-traditions. It 
is important that the values are rationally supportable and that they are 
common, but not essential that some single line of reasoning has led to 
them. In discussing modern politics David Novak remarks that,
Fortunately for Jews and Christians, the type of democratic polity that 
has emerged in the West does not in principle require the absolute 
commitment required by God and his covenanted community. only 
secular totalitarians have attempted to replace the covenant with their 
own absolute claims on the existential commitments of those under 
their control.11
Jews may see their values as grounded in covenant with God but that does 
not distract the focus of their commitment away from life with neighbours 
of different faiths or none at all. Novak adds, ‘It is in the best communal 
interest of Jews and Christians to live in societies that affirm in law and 
public policy what Jews and Christians consider universally just.’12 And, 
‘Jews and Christians also bring these forms of human community to civil 
society for the benefit of all its citizens, even for those of other religions, 
even for those who are secularists.’13 The religious traditions themselves 
can be sources of the relevant values and can encourage the enlargement 
11 David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 
2005), p. 204.
12 Ibid., p. 204.
13 Ibid., p. 204.
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of articulate understanding of them and rational engagement with other 
persons regarding them and their implications.
It is obvious that cultural differences (of many kinds, not just 
religious) can be impediments to the recognition that we are participants 
in a common moral world. Yet, one’s neighbour, supposing that person’s 
life to be shaped by different traditions, need not remain a moral stranger, 
alienated or inaccessible because of the difference in traditions. People 
can differ over what they take to be authoritative sources of evidence for 
moral views without rational dialectic and reciprocity being thwarted or 
grinding to a halt.
II.
Tradition can be a source of moral learning in which the values learned 
are universal in scope while the tradition is particular in its concreteness. 
There are ways in which traditions can habituate people in narrow 
perspectives, a kind of moral selectivity, and lack of regard for persons 
who are not participants in the tradition. but that is not an integral 
feature of tradition; those are ways a tradition can be morally corrupt. 
many people acquire their values and attitudes through education 
in a  tradition, and tradition can encourage civility, respect for human 
dignity, concern for others, and a commitment to justice, for example. 
It may be that such values are more effectively learned through the rich, 
lived detail of specific practices, modes of attention, and disciplines 
of conduct than they are learned through transmission of abstract 
principles. It is a mistake to think of tradition as a ladder on which to 
climb to universal or objective values and then do away with the ladder. 
The practices associated with a  tradition can be ways of sustaining 
genuine commitment to the values.
Indeed, in the maimonidean view of tradition there is a  spiral 
of mutual reinforcement involving practice on the one hand, and 
enlargement of understanding on the other. Practice habituates people 
and shapes dispositions to act in certain ways for certain kinds of 
reasons. The agent is then in a position to reflect on those dispositions 
and the reasons for them, and attain a fuller, more critical understanding 
of them. That understanding, which enables the agent to appreciate the 
practices, can strengthen the motivation to act in the relevant ways. And 
because reflection is itself part of what one is habituated into, the agent is 
better able to engage with persons outside the tradition, is better able to 
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elucidate its point and to see how other traditions might strive to realize 
similar values.
Traditions can do much to support values and practices crucial to 
the liberal order and civil society, practices of justice, charity, integrity, 
and moral awareness. Tradition should not be interpreted as habituating 
people in narrowness of vision and close-mindedness. There are 
traditions that enjoin critical thought rather than hostile defensiveness 
or habits of not thinking for one’s self.
In the rationalistically-oriented Jewish tradition to which I  have 
made reference, part of living in accord with tradition is the way people 
learn universal values and principles.14 The particularism of revelation 
and tradition is not essentially at odds with moral universality or 
objectivity. The values learned are not values only for the particular 
community though a great deal of the form of life and activity through 
which they are learned reflects the particularity of the community. While 
many of the tradition’s requirements are clearly specific to that particular 
tradition – and may seem inscrutable or just plain strange to others – 
they are understood as parts of the textured, complex, overall discipline 
of acquiring virtues. They are one people’s special responsibility but the 
virtues that are shaped are human virtues, and they are not meaningful 
only within a particular community or people. In fact, maimonides argued 
that the perfection to which Torah guides people is human perfection, 
not something limited to the Jewish people as having a distinct nature.15
The covenanted community has a vital place in how commitments, 
ideals, and principles are acquired and transmitted. Tradition supplies 
a specific architecture of moral life through which individuals and the 
community engage with objective valuative considerations and come 
to understand them. The view combines a  rationalist disposition with 
a kind of epistemic humility. one reason tradition is to be respected is 
that it sustains the project of seeking improved understanding. Hence, 
even when the justification of what is required is obscure we still have 
14 I  develop this view further in, ‘The reasons of the Commandments: rational 
Tradition Without Natural law’, in Reason, Religion and Natural Law: Plato to Spinoza 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2012), pp. 106-129.
15 see menachem Kellner’s Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People for 
explication of this maimonidean view and its intellectualist perfectionism. maimonides 
(in contrast to, say, Judah Halevi) did not believe that the Jewish people had a distinct 
nature or that in order to be a  Jew one had to have a certain lineage. Maimonides on 
Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany: state university of New York Press, 1991).
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a tether to it in a way that connects it with the understanding we have 
achieved so far. That way, the requirement’s meaningful connections 
with our overall understanding can be more effectively realized.
maimonides argued that we cannot attain understanding without 
practice, and practice needs to be guided by Torah and tradition. As 
indicated above, the view is that we cannot grasp the rationality of some 
of the commandments without leading lives in accord with them.16 The 
practices associated with tradition are a way of making the values real 
elements of our lives and world. And, we have a responsibility to seek to 
understand those values and the reasons that justify them. lenn Goodman 
describes the law’s role in facilitating human perfection as follows:
... right actions facilitate right choices by forming good habits; virtues 
promote right actions, since a  virtue is, by definition, a  disposition 
toward appropriate action. The commandments nurture certain kinds 
of choices, both for the life those choices foster for the individual and 
the community. Neither virtuous actions nor the virtues themselves are 
valued solely for their intrinsic worth. both contribute to the good life 
materially, morally, and intellectually.17
The practices and dispositions cultivated by fidelity to tradition are 
intended to do real good in the life of the community rather than having 
value solely in terms of disciplined conformity. one could maintain the 
latter – scrupulously, even – and not have enlarged one’s understanding 
or genuinely acquired a  virtue. mere legalistic conformity lacks the 
spiral of mutual reinforcement between understanding and conduct that 
maimonides and others took to be the point of the commandments. They 
are meant to perfect persons, not just test them for obedient conformity.
Tradition’s normative authority is not automatically an impediment to 
adherents having the sorts of dispositions and values-horizon needed for 
participation in a liberal polity. There are reasons to recognize tradition 
16 see the articles and chapters mentioned in notes 3 and 14 for a fuller account of the 
spiral of mutual reinforcement resulting from the relations between ethical virtue and 
intellectual virtue, especially in maimonides though detectable in bahya ibn Pakuda, 
too. see bahya’s The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart (oxford: littman library 
of Jewish Civilization, 2000). many of the medievals had a  much more rationalistic 
conception of religion than is prevalent in many places in the modern world. many of the 
medievals regarded reason and religion as modes of access to one body of truth, and they 
sought to explicate how reason and faith complement and reinforce each other, rather 
than drawing a bright line separating and compartmentalizing them.
17 lenn Goodman, God of Abraham (New York: oxford university Press, 1996), p. 192.
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as a possible source of valuable support for liberal democracy. We should 
consider the substance of particular traditions to see what values they 
endorse and what sorts of dispositions, attitudes, and perspectives they 
encourage. It would be illiberal, and almost certainly counterproductive, 
to dismiss traditions at the outset, simply for failing to satisfy a standard 
of public reason or because it is supposed that they inevitably narrow 
people’s moral view. Also, it can be important to consider how a tradition 
responds to changing historical circumstances and to the ways of life and 
views of the world commended by other traditions.
III.
I have remarked that a disposition of civility may be more important to 
the political order than rational agreement on all fundamental political 
matters. A civil civic culture can accommodate a measure of disagreement 
and participants are likely to be disposed to seek constructive resolutions 
rather than there being a  fixed standard for how the matter should 
be concluded. How can different, historically particular traditions 
contribute to civil society?
by ‘civil society’ I mean all of those contexts, activities, associations, 
and interactions in which persons engage voluntarily and not by 
requirement of the law of the state.18 That a young person should attend 
school or at least be educated to a certain level might be a requirement 
of the state but in a  liberal political order there are multiple options 
for educating young people and, to that extent, education counts as an 
activity of civil society. economic activity, professional associations, 
religious organizations, leisure activities, the arts, and all manner of 
cultural activity count as elements of civil society. In a  liberal political 
order persons have extensive liberty to participate in civil society in 
accord with their own interests, values, and preferences and participation 
in civil society can supply people with reasons to strive to preserve the 
liberal order.
When civil society is extensive, when people’s lives are shaped in large 
part by voluntary association, decision, and activity, and the texture of the 
social world is largely spontaneous rather than commanded, individuals 
exercise voluntary, purposeful agency. This is so even if the spontaneity is 
18 The way in which I use the notion of civil society in this paper is strongly influenced 
by edward shils’ treatment of the topic, especially in The Virtue of Civility.
16 JoNATHAN JACobs
informed by tradition, orderliness, and considerable predictability. Civil 
society in this sense is not a thing; it is a way of living. It is not possible 
without liberty and the converse is true, as well. Civil society is a mode 
of social and economic life in which a diversity of values is pursued and 
there is openness to changing patterns of interaction, shifting interests, 
and patterns of association but not necessarily a hurried pace of change. 
There is extensive scope for individual and group purposefulness but 
there is no overall ‘plan’.
The values necessary for a flourishing civil society find some of their 
strongest cultural anchors in biblical religion, even if their idiom in 
secular society fails to refer to that anchor. edward shils writes:
our appreciation of the value of the individual human being and of 
the value of his self-expression and self-protection is fundamentally 
an appreciation of the sacredness of his existence. That we call this 
appreciation self-evident is itself a product of a long tradition. The system 
of freedom – with its self-restraint of the powerful, its acknowledgment 
of the worth of other persons, its reluctance to submit to authority, and, 
above all, its aspiration to rational self-determination – can flourish only 
if it is permeated with a largely unreflective acceptance of these rules of 
the game of the free society.19
The more informed we are concerning religious roots of values, 
principles, and ideals we take to be fundamental, the more puzzling it 
sounds that religion – at least certain forms of it – should be thought 
threatening to liberal values. It is true that the language of a  faith-
tradition is not an idiom of value-neutrality. It is also true that much of 
the most important early modern political thought that led to the theory 
of the liberal state was motivated by the horrors of religious warfare 
and spectacular sectarian violence and cruelty. However, religion is not 
a uniquely accountable motive for civil war and neighbour slaughtering 
neighbour, and despite the sorry historical record it remains true that 
many of the fundamental values of the liberal polity have religious roots 
and are sustained by religious commitment.
Theistic considerations figure centrally in some of the most important 
moral/intellectual history by which we have become able to articulate 
politically fundamental values. In addition, the values and the traditions 
can be understood in such a way that their particularity is not necessarily 
19 edward shils, The Virtue of Civility, ed. by steven Grosby (Indianapolis: liberty 
Fund, 1997), p. 110.
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in conflict with universal validity. The particularism of a tradition can be 
a way in which the vitality and significance of values is preserved. That 
elements of tradition remain living convictions for many people is not, in 
its own right, evidence of the dubious rationality or narrow-mindedness 
of such people. It is not as though, in the political context, the choice is 
between public reason on the one hand, and religion and tradition on the 
other, as mutually exclusive, antithetical possibilities.
It is vitally important to be able to articulate one’s rationale for 
political judgments and positions in a  manner intelligible to others. 
However, any putative notion of public reason will almost surely limit 
and constrain political discourse in a  needlessly presumptive manner. 
Forgoing a  standard of public reason does not mean abandoning 
a  concern to support one’s views on grounds aspiring to intelligibility 
and even objectivity. There may be multiple pathways to objective values 
and to principles meriting universal endorsement. Diverse, particular 
traditions can be sources of objective, universal values. rootedness in 
a tradition is not, as such, a basis for concluding that the values in question 
are wholly ‘domesticated’ to that tradition, relative to it, having validity 
and significance only for it.20 Traditions can encourage a disposition of 
civility and an interest in mutual understanding without ceasing to be 
particular, historically individuated traditions with special significance 
to their adherents.
Discussing ways in which tradition can develop and be responsive 
through reason while having roots in particular origins, macIntyre writes:
For such a tradition, if it is to flourish at all, as we have already learned, 
has to be embodied in a set of texts which function as the authoritative 
point of departure for tradition-constituted enquiry and which remain 
20 In recent moral philosophy it would be unsurprising to find that tradition is given 
an important role in moral epistemology and moral life by persons defending relativism. 
If one denies that there are objective or universal moral values, then a focus on tradition 
could be an important way of explaining a society or a culture’s morality. Its morality 
would be domesticated to the values and the norms the society happens to accept, and 
tradition could be a  way of preserving moral perspectives and the coherence of the 
group’s moral view. However, there is this other way of regarding tradition, namely, 
understanding it as a mode of access to objective moral value rather than being what is 
relied upon in the absence of objective value. If there are objective moral values but our 
comprehension of them is not via self-evidence, intuition or the a priori, then tradition 
can be an important way of educating persons in the habits and practices that are a basis 
for coming to comprehend those values. That is one of the main ways in which tradition 
can be related to a realist or objective conception of moral values.
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as essential points of reference for enquiry and activity, for argument, 
debate, and conflict within that tradition.21
The embedding, the anchoring, should not be presumed to thwart critical 
considerations and interaction with others. Tradition can be open to 
historical development and to elaboration via encounter. Tradition 
need not be the enemy of criticism, engagement with other traditions 
and views, and reflective self-assessment. It is easy to overlook the fact 
that when we refer to ‘the Jewish tradition’ or ‘the Catholic tradition’, 
for example, we are almost certainly referring to multiple traditions 
exhibiting differences of practice and to some extent differences in 
belief and commitment.22 Perhaps certain founding texts, historical 
particulars, and theological doctrines are essential to being recognizable 
as ‘the Jewish tradition’ or ‘the Catholic tradition’. but a tradition that is 
not hysterically defensive – even if it is committed to certain dogmas – 
need not be closed to rational, critical interaction, and to development.
earlier, I mentioned that there is a debate over whether Jewish moral 
thought is properly interpreted as including or being a version of natural 
law.23 Perhaps, outside fairly small academic circles that debate is of 
21 Alisdair macIntyre, Whose Reason? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: university of 
Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 383.
22 The expression, ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ is used rather freely in discussions of 
the morality of the West or of the united states or Atlantic civilization, and the like. In 
fact, Judaism and Christianity differ in some significant respects. The place of theology in 
Christianity suggests some of the differences. Judaism does not have a dogmatic, doctrinal 
core in the same manner as Christianity, and theology does not have a role in Judaism in 
the way it does in Christianity. Also, the understanding of divine graciousness and what 
is involved in redemption, both its character and the means of it, differ in important 
ways. Yet, there are significant, shared elements and of course, Christians regard the New 
Testament as having essential roots and anticipations in Tanakh, read as Old Testament 
(with some changes in contents and order of texts). There are fundamentally important 
aspects of moral overlap regarding Judaism and Christianity; that is not to be denied. 
still, it is not the case that the religions are so similar, and that the relationship between 
human beings and God is so similar, that it makes unproblematic good sense to refer to 
them together as ‘the Judeo-Christian tradition’ as though each differs from the other 
only in certain details.
23 There is a growing literature on the question of whether Jewish moral thought, and 
especially medieval thought, should be interpreted as including or resembling natural 
law theorizing. David Novak’s Natural Law in Judaism (New York: Cambridge university 
Press, 1998), has been an important contribution to the debate. I criticize his view and 
argue for interpreting medieval Jewish moral thought as not involving natural law in 
‘Judaism and Natural law’, The Heythrop Journal (2009), pp. 930-947. see also, chapters 
six and seven of Law, Reason, and Morality in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (oxford: oxford 
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little interest. It is important, though, as an illustration of something 
of possibly wide significance, even if explicit interest in it is not widely 
shared. It involves different religious traditions and important currents 
of secular thought in a manner that is an occasion for all participants to 
more articulately understand the other parties to the debate and in the 
course of doing so, more articulately and critically appreciate their own 
traditions and views. The conduct of the debate does not require the prior 
formulation of a fully defined standard of reason. The commitment to 
reason and reasonableness in a much broader, more informal sense, and 
to civility are sufficient. Discussants can enter into the debate genuinely 
only because they are already disposed to a combination of conviction 
and openness.
much of the significance of the debate over natural law turns on 
the ways that different traditions understand the reasons for certain 
moral judgments and principles. It is not a  ‘merely’ academic debate; 
it concerns action-guiding considerations of real relevance. such 
a debate requires a high degree of intellectual and moral self-awareness, 
something quite the opposite of dogmatic intransigence. Granted, it may 
be much less problematic to attain dialectical civility in a  scholarly or 
intellectual context than in a  political context. (Well, maybe.) but the 
debate illustrates how traditions can be committed to the universality 
of numerous significant values, and can be open to learning how other 
traditions understand the grounds of those values and their implications 
for the business of living. The interaction of traditions can reinforce the 
disposition of civility and can contribute to ethical education.
The recent history of dialogue between the Abrahamic monotheistic 
faiths and the recognition that there is significant overlap between 
them regarding many fundamental values is encouraging evidence 
that thoughtful, morally serious persons can find ways for religious 
university Press, 2010). I distinguish the metaethics of a conception of Jewish tradition 
from the metaethics of practical wisdom and of natural law, while acknowledging 
significant overlap between the maimonidean conception of tradition, practical wisdom, 
and natural law. The chief point is that the particularities of a tradition can be a mode 
of access to objective, universally valid ethical judgments. It is likely that a great many 
people come to endorse values that are universally valid (or at least have a plausible claim 
to universal validity) through learning moral concepts and familiarity with paradigm 
cases within the contexts of particular traditions. moral education in objective, universal 
values does not have to be achieved (and is probably rarely achieved) through abstract 
considerations ‘uncontaminated’ with the concrete particularities of specific traditions.
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commitment to expand the disposition of civility. one of the chief gains 
from this is that a much more articulate fluency with value-pluralism 
will be achieved, hopefully displacing the brittle compartmentalization 
that characterizes ‘multiculturalism’ in its currently prevalent forms. 
The religious traditions can provide a  socially significant example of 
how a common core of anchoring values can support multiple forms of 
expression and a diversity of practices promoting common goods.
one of the chief obstacles to this is the way that so much recent 
political thought  – in the name of liberal neutrality  – has excluded 
religiously grounded considerations from public political discourse in 
a  manner that has helped render people inarticulate with respect to 
a rich vocabulary of value and silenced certain forms of expression of 
moral conviction. much more would be gained by political discourse 
that provided more opportunities for people to learn about each other 
(and themselves) by permitting much more open expressions of religion. 
This could be helpful by making it necessary for people to negotiate 
conflicts of value, concern, and interest by understanding each other’s 
valuative idioms and their reasons for their commitments. If people are 
not given a chance to demonstrate the respects in which their religious 
commitments are amenable to rational support and articulation it is very 
likely that mutual suspicion and ignorance will remain the prevailing 
modus operandi regarding the role of religion in politics.
Perhaps both political and epistemic benefits can flow from the fact 
that multiple traditions can commend and encourage similar values 
while maintaining their distinctive cultural features. There would be 
possibilities of constructive interaction between traditions, efforts at 
elaboration and response to difficult cases and to objections and critique, 
and civil society could include educative cultural ‘traffic’ between 
diverse groups while accommodating many of their differences. There 
are ways in which the different traditions participating in a pluralistic 
society can be gainers from it rather than constantly at risk of ‘dilution’. 
Interacting – practically and intellectually – with others’ traditions can 
be a way of enlarging and adding depth and texture to one’s own moral 
understanding through seeing how different narratives, images, and 
foci of concern can anchor valuative commitments. Tradition can be 
valuable for supplying stability of reference to moral ideas as those ideas 
are elaborated, extended, and revised in response to new kinds of cases 
relevant to them.24
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In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam considerable thought has gone 
into engaging with the moral and social issues faced in the contemporary 
world, including matters of medical ethics, criminal justice, education, 
and other issues. This is not to say that in each tradition a  single, 
normatively authoritative voice speaks for it. The reality is much 
more interestingly complex than that. The point is that a  liberal polity 
could gain by permitting that multiplicity of voices to participate in 
the common discourse of politics, instead of compartmentalizing and 
restricting it in ways that are impediments to people learning from 
each other. Differences over eschatology and over the metaphysics 
of redemption need not be translated directly into an inability to 
jointly address issues with substantial valuative dimensions. religious 
traditions, with their long practice at connecting the realities of actual 
historical circumstances with permanent, enduring ideals could prove to 
be sources of considerable help.24
There is no question that religious traditions are often embraced 
and defended in ways that are hostile to any doubt or challenge. but 
that is because of the content and character of those traditions, and not 
simply because they are traditions or simply because they are religious. 
A  tradition can value rational reflection and criticism, and can be 
responsive to challenges, hard questions, and new situations. A tradition 
is not, as such, necessarily closed to fruitful interaction or dogmatically 
sealed off from reflective criticism. A tradition can be a rational tradition 
without claiming a monopoly on rationality, without stubbornly refusing 
to be open to criticism and to being informed by ideas and sources 
external to it. A religious tradition can be rational in how it is elaborated 
and articulated, even if it is rooted in claims of revelation. Having that 
origin is not automatically a  mark against the rationality of those for 
whom religion is a source of living conviction, a guide to right conduct, 
and to how to engage with others with different beliefs and commitments.
24 Anchoring points in tradition may not always supply a kind of fixity or clarity of 
the values at issue. some anchoring points are important because of the perplexity they 
motivate, generation after generation. Consider, for instance, the Akedah or Job, and also 
the moral imperfections of individuals such as Jacob and David. In those cases, tradition 
motivates moral thought, the testing of moral imagination, and the need for experiments 
in insight because of the difficulty and morally equivocal aspects of individuals and acts. 
This is a kind of stability of reference, not to paradigmatic moral resolution or certainty 
but to enduringly challenging moral difficulty.
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Thinkers in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions have 
formulated conceptions of how rational aspiration could be a  central 
element of Abrahamic monotheism. I  am not suggesting that 
maimonides, Aquinas, and Alfarabi, for instance, are directly relevant 
to contemporary politics. Nor am I suggesting that their views of their 
respective religious traditions should be normative. The point is the more 
general one that it is a mistake, and an illiberal burden upon religion, 
to assume that the rational intelligibility of political discourse requires 
the exclusion of religiously grounded considerations. There is a  rich 
history of interpenetration of those traditions and of influences flowing 
in multiple directions. At the same time, they share some fundamental 
values and commitments, and there is a solid, anchoring basis for mutual 
respect and a continuing dialectic of moral engagement with each other, 
along with enlarged self-understanding attained through responsiveness 
to those values and commitments.
excluding religiously grounded considerations from political 
discourse is likely to impede civil interaction and mutual understanding. 
In doing so, it only makes interaction between different views less 
educative, more guarded, and less trusting. It shuts out a sphere of rational 
interaction and thereby diminishes civil society. This presupposes rather 
considerable virtues on the part of religious persons. but why should we 
start out by thinking that those virtues are less likely to be characteristics 
of religious persons?25
25 A version of this paper was originally presented in berlin, at a Workshop for the 
Analytic Theology Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation. I am 
very grateful to the Foundation and to the organizers of the Workshop.
